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Impulsivity is regarded as a multifaceted construct that comprises two dimensions:
rapid-response impulsivity and reward-delay impulsivity. It is unclear, however, which
aspects of trait impulsivity, as assessed by self-report measures are related to
rapid-response impulsivity and/or to reward-delay impulsivity, as different results have
been reported in studies using both self-report and cognitive measures. This study
aimed to directly relate self-report measures of impulsivity to cognitive measures
of impulsivity in individuals at low- or high-levels on two impulsivity dimensions,
specifically rapid-response impulsivity and reward-delay impulsivity. Participants were
classified into high- or low-impulsivity groups based on (1) level of rapid-response
impulsivity (determined by BIS-11 Motor subscale scores); (2) level of reward-delay
impulsivity (determined by BIS/BAS subscale scores); and (3) a combination of
rapid-response impulsivity and reward-delay impulsivity levels. Impulsivity was assessed
using Go/No-Go, Stop-Signal and Delay-Discounting tasks and self-report measures.
The high rapid-response impulsivity group showed significantly higher reward-delay
impulsivity on both, the Delay-Discounting tasks and on self-report measures
assessing reward-delay impulsivity, than the low-risk group. Based on the level of
reward-delay impulsivity, the high reward-delay impulsivity group scored significantly
higher on task-based (cognitive) and self-report measures assessing rapid-response
inhibition than the low reward-delay impulsivity group. Combining both dimensions
of impulsivity showed that the high-impulsivity group performed significantly worse in
rapid-response paradigms and temporally discounted significantly more impulsively than
the low-impulsivity group. Thus, combined impulsivity factors provide better assessment
of impulsivity than each dimension alone. In conclusion, robust differences in impulsivity
can be identified in non-clinical young adults.
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INTRODUCTION
Impulsivity, as a trait, is defined as “a predisposition toward rapid, unplanned reactions to internal
or external stimuli without regard to the negative consequences of these reactions to the impulsive
individual or to others” (Moeller et al., 2001; p. 1784). Thus, impulsivity is a socially relevant
construct, impacting on society (e.g., business, criminal justice, education) as well as individuals
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(e.g., aggressive or anti-social behaviors) (Stanford et al., 2009). It
has been reported to characterize several mental disorders, such
as attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Nigg, 2001),
drug addiction (Jentsch and Taylor, 1999; Bari and Robbins,
2013), and bipolar spectrum disorders (Strakowski et al., 2009).
Trait impulsivity is assessed by using self-report measures such
as the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, Patton and Stanford,
1995), the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS; Whiteside and
Lynam, 2001) or the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ;
Eysenck et al., 1985), specifically the Psychoticism subscale (Holt
et al., 2003; Lewis et al., 2009).
Impulsivity is regarded as a multifaceted construct that
comprises two dimensions: rapid-response impulsivity (also
referred to as response inhibition or impulsive action) and
reward-delay impulsivity or impulsive choice (Dawe et al., 2004;
Dawe and Loxton, 2004; Winstanley et al., 2004; Alloy et al.,
2009; Swann, 2010; MacKillop et al., 2016). Rapid-response
impulsivity refers to a tendency to perform immediate actions,
often without any forethought or a diminished ability to inhibit
a pre-potent response (Moeller et al., 2001; Hamilton et al.,
2015). Impulsive choice is described as diminished ability or
willingness to tolerate delays (Hamilton et al., 2015). Although
both constructs link back to core theoretical definitions of
impulsivity they tend to correlate only weakly or not at all (Lane
et al., 2003; Reynolds et al., 2006; Broos et al., 2012). These
dimensions of impulsivity can be assessed using cognitive tasks,
in addition to self-report measures. However, it is not clear which
aspects of trait impulsivity, as assessed by self-report measures,
such as the BIS-11, are related to response inhibition and/or to
reward-delay impulsivity, as different results have been reported
in studies using both self-report measures and cognitive tasks
(Dick et al., 2010).
Rapid-response impulsivity has been investigated using the
go/no-go task (GNGT) and the stop-signal task (SST) (Criaud
and Boulinguez, 2013; Hamilton et al., 2015). These paradigms
have been proposed to assess two different processes. GNGT
assesses “action restraint” as it measures the inhibition of a
planned response. Omission errors, i.e., withholding a response
to a “Go” stimulus, and commission errors, i.e., responding
to a “No Go” stimulus, index rapid-response impulsivity. SST
measures “action cancelation” as it assesses the inhibition of an
initiated response (Schachar et al., 2007; Eagle et al., 2008; Swick
et al., 2011; Bari and Robbins, 2013). This distinction is supported
by growing evidence from neuroimaging studies (e.g., Swick
et al., 2011; Sebastian et al., 2013; Dambacher et al., 2014) which
have shown different, in addition to common, neural patterns
of activations when both paradigms are examined. The current
study examined both paradigms to assess both functional aspects
of impulsivity.
Self-report measures that tap into rapid-response impulsivity
include the Motor-subscale of the BIS-11 and the Urgency
subscale of the UPPS, the latter being reported to significantly
correlate with SST performance (Wilbertz et al., 2014). However,
significant associations between cognitive tasks assessing
response inhibition and self-report measures are not consistently
reported (e.g., Rodrìguez-Fornells et al., 2002; Horn et al., 2003;
Spinella, 2004; Keilp et al., 2005; Lijffijt et al., 2005; Enticott et al.,
2006; Reynolds et al., 2006; Aichert et al., 2012; Malesza and
Ostaszewski, 2016).
The second dimension of impulsivity, reward-delay
impulsivity or impulsive choice has been investigated in
terms of the behavioural approach system (BAS) hypersensitivity
model (e.g., Alloy and Abramson, 2010; Alloy et al., 2012;
Molz et al., 2013; Duek et al., 2014; Nusslock et al., 2014). The
reward hyper-sensitivity model proposes that individuals with a
hyper-sensitive BAS may show exaggerated approach behaviors
toward reward and goal cues (Molz et al., 2013). This can
lead to drastic fluctuations of BAS activation and deactivation.
Activation of the BAS by positive cues (e.g., positive life events,
specifically those involving goal-striving and goal-attainment),
can result in characteristics, or symptoms, such as increased
energy, optimism, decreased need for sleep (Alloy et al., 2009). In
contrast, deactivation of the BAS by negative cues (e.g., negative
life-events, specifically those including failure to obtain – or loss
of – goals/rewards) can result in depressive characteristics, or
symptoms, resembling depressions, such as anhedonia, decreased
energy or sadness (Urosevic´ et al., 2008; Alloy and Abramson,
2010).
It has also been suggested that BAS hyperactivity may result
in impulsive decision-making (Mason et al., 2012). When a
reward cue activates the hyper-reactive BAS, anticipation of this
reward may be responsible for generating an impulsive “state”
(Bari and Robbins, 2013) which influences decision-making. BAS
hyper-sensitivity toward rewards may result in an inability to
delay gratification. This behavior is assessed using questionnaires
such as the BIS/BAS scales (Carver and White, 1994). The UPPS
(Lack of) Premeditation subscale has also been used to assess
this inability to delay gratification (Lynam and Miller, 2004; Alloy
et al., 2008, 2009; Urosevic´ et al., 2008; Stojek et al., 2014). It has
been reported that individuals scoring low on this subscale were
more likely to prefer small and immediate rewards compared to
larger but delayed rewards (Lynam and Miller, 2004; Stojek et al.,
2014).
Previous experimental studies have assessed reward-delay
impulsivity using the delay discounting task (DDT; Kirby
et al., 1999; Johnson and Bickel, 2002). This task requires
participants to choose between either small but immediate, or
large but delayed rewards, typically amounts of hypothetical
money. Higher rates of delay discounting are associated
with self-report measures of impulsivity (e.g., Kirby et al.,
1999), sensation seeking (Richards et al., 1999) or suicidal
ideation and behavior (Cáceda et al., 2014). Greater discounting
has also been reported in populations with impulse control
problems, such as compulsive gamblers (Reynolds et al.,
2006; Ledgerwood et al., 2009), acute alcohol, cocaine and
methamphetamine users (Coffey et al., 2003; Bari and Robbins,
2013) or tobacco smokers (Baker et al., 2003). Similarly
to inconsistent results reporting correspondence between
cognitive tasks and self-report measures assessing rapid-response
impulsivity, evidence shows that reward-delay tasks and self-
report measures do not always correlate well (e.g., Reynolds
et al., 2006; Murphy and MacKillop, 2012). Stojek et al.
(2014), for instance, suggested that reward-delay tasks may
not be sufficiently sensitive to assess particular impulsivity
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dimensions, as measured by questionnaires, yet, the reverse
could also be true due to the biased nature of self-report
measures.
The current study set out to re-investigate previous failures of
finding a strong relationship between cognitive and self-report
measures of impulsivity dimensions, specifically response
inhibition and reward-delay. Therefore, it is of vital importance
to investigate these two dimensions in conjunction. Here, we
administered self-report measures of trait impulsivity to classify
individual impulsivity levels, and then relate this classification
to cognitive measures of impulsivity. The aim was to clarify the
robustness of self-report questionnaires as genuine predictors
of behavioral impulsivity. Although the two dimensions of
impulsivity, rapid-response and reward-delay impulsivity,
have been extensively investigated, there are still considerable
issues that need to be clarified: First, the lack of consistency
regarding the extent of associations between cognitive tasks
and self-reports; and secondly, the need to further understand
the relationship between these two dimensions of impulsivity.
In the present study, associations between rapid-response
impulsivity and reward delay impulsivity will be investigated
in an undergraduate student population. Inhibitory control
and reward sensitivity seem naturally inter-related concepts,
however, studies of such interactions have been limited. Contrary
to most published reports, Meda et al. (2009) showed good
correspondence between cognitive and self-report measures of
impulsivity, including a delay-discounting task and BIS/BAS,
BIS-11 measures.
Here, we classified participants into high and low impulsive
groups, depending on the absence, or presence, of the following:
(a) level of rapid-response impulsivity – as determined by
BIS-11 Motor sub-scale scores, (b) level of reward-delay
impulsivity – as determined by BAS Total scores, and (c) a
combination of both levels. Factor analyses of the impulsivity
construct have proposed that impulsivity domains such as
rapid-response impulsivity and reward-delay impulsivity reflect
discrete impulsivity dimensions (e.g., MacKillop et al., 2016).
However, overlap has also been reported (e.g., Meda et al.,
2009), suggesting that impulsivity domains may be less distinct.
A combined group was therefore added to investigate to
what extent trait dimensions of rapid-response impulsivity and
reward-delay impulsivity together would impact on and interact
with cognitive tasks. These groups performed response inhibition
and reward-delay experimental tasks to clarify the relationship
between self-report measures and behavioral effects, and to assess
how sensitive these measures are to differences between high- and
low-impulsivity groups. Associations between our cognitive
tasks assessing rapid-response and reward-delay impulsivity
will also be examined to further elucidate the contradictory
results reported to date. Overall, this will help clarifying the
relationship between self-report and cognitive measures of trait
impulsivity as well as the relationship between the dimensions of
response-inhibition and reward delay.
We hypothesized that: (1) Performance on the cognitive
tasks assessing each of the two dimensions of impulsivity (i.e.,
rapid-response and reward-delay impulsivity) will correlate
with the corresponding self-report measures assessing each
dimension. (2) Single high-impulsive vs. single low-impulsive
and combined high impulsive vs. low-impulsive groups will
perform significantly differently on cognitive tasks assessing
impulsivity: High-impulsive individuals (single and combined
high-risk) are expected to show impaired response inhibition
on the GNGT and SST, and an inability to delay reward on the
DDT. (3) Single high-impulsive vs. single low-impulsive and
combined high- vs. low-impulsive groups will score significantly
differently on self-report measures assessing rapid-response
and reward-delay impulsivity: High-impulsive individuals
(single and combined impulsivity dimensions) are expected
to score significantly higher on self-report measures than the
low-impulsive group.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were recruited through advertisements around
Aston University. 175 undergraduate students who were aged 18
to 26 and enrolled in psychology or business courses at Aston
University participated and received either course credit or £7.50
for their time. Eight participants were excluded from the analysis
due to incomplete data, resulting in a total of 167 participants for
analysis (143 females, Mage = 19.43, SDage = 1.72). Our sample
was ethnically diverse, consisting of White (40%), Asian (37%),
Black (13%), Chinese (5%), and Mixed (7%) heritage. This is in
line with the ethnic representation of the West Midlands and
Birmingham, United Kingdom, region.
Procedure
The experimental procedures were in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the Aston University
Ethics Committee, including consent, in writing, prior
to any data collection. During each session, which lasted
approximately 60 min, each participant completed the cognitive
tasks measuring rapid-response impulsivity and reward-delay
sensitivity in a randomized order. All tasks were administered
using EPrime 2.0 Professional (Psychology Software Tools1).
Demographic and self-report questionnaires were completed in
randomized order via Bristol Online Surveys2, using the same
computer. A researcher was present during all data collection.
Cognitive tasks and self-report measures were presented in a
counter-balanced order.
Cognitive Tasks
Rapid-Response Impulsivity: Go/No-Go Task (GNGT)
This study used a modified version of the GNGT described by
Rubia et al. (2001), presenting 75% go trials instead of 70% go
trials. This decision was based on previous studies (e.g., Zheng
et al., 2008), which argued that using a simpler go/nogo task, i.e.,
one with a lower percentage of no-go trials, would reduce the load
of other cognitive functions, e.g., working memory processes,
apart from action restraint. The stimuli used in this GNGT were
1http://www.pstnet.com/
2http://www.onlinesurveys.ac.uk
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letters. Participants first completed a practice block of 20 trials,
the proceeded to complete two blocks of 140 trials each, with the
option of taking a rest between blocks. The variables of interest
were the reaction times (GNGT RTs) on correct responses to “go”
trials and the raw number of commission errors during “no-go”
trials. For more detail on the task, please see Figure 1A. GNGT
have been reported to demonstrate content validity (Moeller
et al., 2001), concurrent validity – evidenced by correlations with
measures such as the SST and moderate to high level of test-retest
reliability (Weafer et al., 2013; Hamilton et al., 2015).
Rapid-Response Impulsivity: Stop-Signal Task (SST)
In this paradigm, a “go” stimulus was occasionally followed by a
“stop signal” (delayed by 250ms) at an occurrence rate of 25% of
the total trials, see Figure 1B for a description of the SST and
its timing parameters. Participants completed a practice block
of 20 trials and two blocks of 140 trials each, having a rest
between blocks. The variables of interest were the Stop-Signal
Task reaction times (SSRTs) on “go” trials and of the raw number
of commission errors on “stop” trials. The latter was included
because the proportion of successful stop trials (calculated as the
number of responses made on stop-trials divided by the total
number of stop trials) provides information about the ability
to withhold an already initiated response (Dougherty et al.,
2005). SSRTs were estimated by subtracting the stop-signal delay
(250ms) from the mean “go”-trial reaction time, a procedure
following that of Logan et al. (1997). SSTs have been reported to
demonstrate good content validity (Moeller et al., 2001), good
concurrent validity – evidenced by correlations with measures
such as the GNG, and moderately high test-retest reliability
(Weafer et al., 2013; Wostmann et al., 2013; Hamilton et al.,
2015).
Reward-Delay Impulsivity: Delay Discounting Task
(DDT)
The DDT (Kirby et al., 1999) consisted of 27 hypothetical
choices between a small but immediate reward (£11–£80) and
a larger reward (£25–£85) delayed between 7 and 186 days.
There was a 1000ms pause between sentences. The primary
measure of delay discounting was the proportion of the smaller,
immediate rewards selected out of the 27 choices. The most
widely used strategy to calculate the discounting rate is based
on either a hyperbolic or an exponential function (e.g., Mazur,
1987; Coffey et al., 2003; Dougherty et al., 2014). However,
the proportion score has also been used previously to assess
delay discounting (e.g., Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2008; Magen
et al., 2008; Benningfield et al., 2014). This alternative is a more
straight-forward approach, as it does not make assumptions
about the shape of the discounting curve and has similar
results to the hyperbolic model (Benningfield et al., 2014), hence
we decided to employ this alternative for the current study.
Previous research has demonstrated that delay-discounting is
stable over time (Simpson and Vuchinich, 2000; Ohmura et al.,
2006; Shamosh et al., 2008) and internally consistent (Cronbach’s
FIGURE 1 | Example of trials: (A) Go/no-go task. Participants provided a response as fast as possible to a “go” (letter O) stimulus by pressing a button on a
keyboard but refrained from reacting to a “no-go” (letter Y) stimulus. (B) Stop-signal task. Participants were requested to withhold their response (‘stop’) when the go
cue (letter O) was followed by a stop-signal (letter X). In both tasks, the fixation cross is presented for 1000ms and the go cues for a maximum of 1000ms or until a
response is given. The inter-stimulus interval is 1100ms as in Rubia et al. (2001). The stop-signal delay (SSD) was set at 250ms after the presentation of the go cue
and the stop cue lasted for 300ms, as in Dambacher et al. (2014).
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α = 0.89) (Hurst et al., 2011). Construct validity for the DDT
has been shown by significant correlations with neurocognitive
measures of impulsivity (Perales et al., 2009) and decision making
(Monterosso et al., 2001).
Self-Report Measures
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale
The BIS-11 (Patton and Stanford, 1995) is a well validated and
reliable measure of trait impulsivity (Stanford et al., 2009). It
consists of 30 items, comprising three subscales: non-planning
(lack of future sense, 11 items), motor (acting on the spur of the
moment without thinking, 11 items), attentional (distractibility,
lack of sustained attention, 8 items), rated on a four-point Likert
scale (1 = rarely/never, 2 = occasionally, 3 = often, 4 = almost
always/always). Stanford et al. (2009) reported that BIS-11 total
scores demonstrate reasonable test–retest reliability over 1 month
(Spearman’s ρ = 0.83) and good internal consistency (α = 0.83),
a finding similar to that of DeVellis (1991), who reported an
α = 0.82. High scores in the sum of all subscales of the BIS-11
indicate high levels of trait impulsivity as a heterogeneous
concept, while high scores on each specific subscale describe
which components of impulsivity have a heavier weight.
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire
The EPQ (Eysenck et al., 1985) is 48-item questionnaire
(responses are YES or NO) with four subscales: Psychoticism,
with items related to impulsivity; Extraversion, which relates to
sociability and venturesomeness; Neuroticism, which measures
emotional stability, and a Lie scale assessing defensiveness.
Higher values on each subscale indicate higher levels of the
corresponding personality trait. The EPQ shows good/acceptable
internal consistency; α ranging from 0.7 (for the Lie scale)
to 0.9 (Extraversion and Neuroticism) (Corulla, 1987; Muniz
et al., 2005). Cronbach’s α for the traditional dichotomous
format shows good reliability for the three subscales of the EPI:
psychoticism sub-scale α = 0.77, extra-version subscale α = 0.78
and neuroticism subscale α = 0.7 (Muniz et al., 2005). This
self-report measure, and similar versions of Eysenck’s personality
questionnaires, have previously been used to investigate the
association between impulsivity self-reports and cognitive tasks
(e.g., Logan et al., 1997; Marsh et al., 2002), but yielded
inconsistent results. Adding this measure allowed further
exploration of impulsivity dimensions.
UPPS Behavior Scale
The UPPS (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001) is a 44-item, Likert-type
scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree)
which has four factor analytically based subscales: Urgency,
(lack of) Premeditation, (lack of) Perseverance and Sensation
Seeking. The sub-scales have good convergent validity, good
discriminant validity and internal consistency of α = 0.8 or
greater for each of the subscales (e.g., Cyders and Smith,
2007; Smith et al., 2007; Cyders, 2013). High scores on this
questionnaire indicate high levels of trait impulsivity. This scale
was included as an additional measure of the two dimensions
explored here, because it includes one specific subscale for
each dimension (Urgency – for rapid-response impulsivity and
(Lack of) Premeditation – for reward-delay). Furthermore,
Wilbertz et al. (2014) found the Urgency subscale, rather than
the BIS-11, to be the only measure that explained individual
variability on response inhibition performance. Hence, this
measure might help clarifying how strong the relationships are
between the two impulsivity dimensions investigated here.
Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation
System Scales
The Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation System
scales (BIS/BAS; Carver and White, 1994) consist of 20 items
that are rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale (from 1 = strongly
disagree to 4 = strongly agree) and comprise three BAS subscales
(reward responsiveness, drive and fun seeking) and one BIS
subscale (reactions to the expectation of punishment). These
scales assessed participants’ sensitivity of the BAS and the
behavioural inhibition system (BIS) to positive and negative cues.
The BIS/BAS scales show good internal validity, with Cronbach’s
α for BAS-Reward, BAS-Drive and BAS-Fun being 0.79, 0.61,
0.68, respectively (Franken et al. (2005) or 0.69, 0.82, 0.76,
respectively (Gomez et al., 2005) and 0.81 to 0.83 for BAS (total)
(Jorm et al., 1999; Erdle and Rushton, 2010). For the BIS scale
internal validity was modest to good with Cronbach’s α ranging
from 0.59 (Franken et al. (2005) to 0.71 (Erdle and Rushton, 2010)
or 0.76 (Jorm et al., 1999) or 0.82 (Gomez et al., 2005). High
scores on this self-report measure indicate high sensitivity to the
BAS or BIS system (see the Introduction for further details). High
scores in the sum of all subscales of the BAS subscales, BAS Total,
indicate high levels of BAS sensitivity, while high scores on each
specific subscale describe which components of BAS sensitivity
have a heavier weight (reward responsiveness, drive, and fun
seeking).
Group Assignment
For statistical analyses, participants were assessed based on (1)
rapid response impulsivity; (2) reward delay impulsivity; and (3)
a combination of rapid response impulsivity and reward delay
impulsivity. High and low impulsivity group assignment was
based on:
For (1) Their BIS-11 Motor sub-scale scores: To assess
rapid-response impulsivity, high- and low-impulsive individuals
were selected from the sample using the highest 35th percentile
and the lowest 35th percentile, respectively. This procedure is in
line with that of Wilbertz et al. (2014) and resulted in two extreme
groups, i.e., a high rapid-response impulsivity group and a low
rapid-response impulsivity group.
For (2) Their BAS Total scores: To assess reward-delay
impulsivity, high-impulsive individuals were selected from the
sample using the highest 15th percentile on the BAS Total scale.
This resulted in a high reward-delay impulsivity group. For
the low reward-delay impulsivity group moderate BAS scores
(between the 40th and 60th percentiles) were chosen. The reason
for choosing the moderate BAS score and not the low BAS
score is because low BAS scores have previously been linked
with unipolar depression (Fowles, 1988; Depue and Iacono, 1989;
Kasch et al., 2002) as well as excessively decreased goal-directed
activity, loss of interest and anhedonia (Alloy et al., 2012).
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Additionally, a moderate BAS score is closer to the mean on the
BAS sensitivity dimension thus representing a more normalized
statistical perspective. This procedure in line with that of Alloy
et al. (2012) and resulted in a low reward-delay impulsivity group.
For (3) A combination of rapid-response impulsivity and
reward-delay impulsivity: Here, participants whose scores
fulfilled both of the above criteria were included. The
high-impulsivity group consisted of participants scoring within
the highest 35th percentile of the BIS-11 Motor sub-scale and
within the highest 15th percentile on the BAS-Total scale. The
low-impulsivity group included participants scoring below 35%
on the BIS-11 Motor sub-scale and between the 40th and 60th
percentiles on the BAS-Total scale.
Statistical Analysis
The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for normality and Levene’s test
for homogeneity of variances were used to assess whether
assumptions were met. Spearman’s ρ was used to examine
correlations between self-report measures and cognitive tasks
as a first, exploratory step. Subsequently, multivariate analyses
of covariance (MANCOVA) were conducted to test differences
between groups on the self-report measures and cognitive
tasks separately, instead of multiple ANCOVAs or a single
MANCOVA on both self-report measures and cognitive tasks,
to reduce the chance of committing a Type I error. In cases
where MANCOVAs were not significant, univariate ANOVAs
were conducted to test a priori hypotheses, using Bonferroni
correction as implemented in SPSS, which adjusts the p-value.
Variables included in the analyses were the cognitive tasks
measures (see above) and the scores on the self-report measures
along with a covariate, participants’ history of mental health
(as assessed by past or current visits to a mental health
provider). Sex or age did not meet all the assumptions to be
included as a covariate, i.e., independence of covariate and
independent variable, homogeneity of the regression slopes and,
when included, did not change the result of the analyses. Partial
eta-squared (η2) values were calculated to measure effect size
and interpreted using Cohen’s (Cohen, 1988) guidelines for
determining small (0.01), medium (0.06) and large (0.14) effects.
All statistical analyses were performed in SPSS (Version 22.0;
SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, United States).
RESULTS
Correlational Analyses
As some of the variables did not meet assumptions for parametric
analysis, Spearman’s ρ was used for all analyses to examine the
correlations between the variables from the self-report measures
and the cognitive tasks. The significance level was adjusted
using Bonferroni correction, so that significant correlations
reported here are based on the adjusted p-values (see Table 1).
Significant positive correlations were observed between the DDT
and the BIS-11 Total score rs = 0.28 (p = 0.000, 2-tailed) and
BIS-11 Non-Planning subscale rs = 0.29 (p = 0.000, 2-tailed).
Similarly, the self-report measures assessing different aspects
of impulsivity, and their subscales, also showed significant
correlations: The BIS-11 Total score and the three BIS-11
subscales (motor, attention and non-planning) significantly
correlated with all UPPS subscales (urgency, premeditation and
perseverance) except for Sensation Seeking (which significantly
correlated with the BIS-11 Total score only), with the EPQ
Psychoticism subscale and BAS Fun subscale, while the BIS-11
Motor subscale also significantly correlated with BAS Drive. The
BAS Reward subscale significantly correlated with two UPPS
subscales, (Lack of) Perseverance and (Lack of) Premeditation,
while the BAS Drive subscale significantly correlated with (Lack
of) Perseverance. The BAS Fun subscale significantly correlated
with the Urgency, (Lack of) Premeditation and Sensation Seeking
UPPS subscales (for all coefficients, see Table 1).
Cognitive Tasks and Questionnaire
Results Based on Impulsivity Group
Rapid-Response Impulsivity
Rapid-response impulsivity was assessed by computing the scores
of the BIS-11 Motor subscale. Those with scores within the
highest 35th percentile of the motor scores in the whole sample
constitute a high rapid-response impulsivity group (n = 73).
Participants within lowest 35th percentile on the BIS-11 Motor
subscale constitute a low rapid-response impulsivity group
(n = 65). This procedure is in line with Wilbertz et al. (2014).
Means and standard deviations of variables are presented in
Tables 2, 3.
A MANCOVA was performed to contrast the two groups on
the cognitive tasks while controlling for mental health history
(see Table 2). The overall MANCOVA showed that groups
classified by their level of motor impulsivity were not significantly
different from each other (Wilks λ = 0.94, F(5,131) = 1.77,
p = 0.123, η2 = 0.06). Although the overall MANCOVA was not
significant, univariate ANOVAs were conducted to test a priori
hypotheses, using Bonferroni correction as implemented in SPSS.
This revealed significant differences between groups for the
proportion of smaller vs. larger reward choices in the DDT, with
a close to medium effect size estimate (F(1,135) = 7.56, p = 0.007,
η2 = 0.05).
A MANCOVA was performed to contrast the two groups
on the self-report measures while controlling for mental health
history (see Table 3). The overall MANCOVA showed that groups
classified by their level of motor impulsivity were significantly
different from each other (Wilks λ = 0.62, F(8,128) = 9.84,
p = 0.000, η2 = 0.38). Univariate ANOVAs revealed significant
differences between groups for BAS Total scores (F(1,135) = 9.86,
p = 0.002, η2 = 0.07), BAS Fun Seeking scores (F(1,135) = 23.56,
p = 0.000, η2 = 0.15), EPQ Psychoticism scores (F(1,135) = 10.21,
p = 0.002, η2 = 0.07), UPPS Urgency (F(1,135) = 32.14,
p = 0.000, η2 = 0.19), UPPS (Lack of) Premeditation scores
(F(1,135) = 41.05, p = 0.000, η2 = 0.23) and UPPS (Lack of)
Perseverance scores (F(1,135) = 17.41, p = 0.000, η2 = 0.11).
Partial eta-squared estimates suggested medium to large effect
sizes for these measures, ranging from 0.07 to 0.23.
Reward-Delay Impulsivity
Reward-delay impulsivity was assessed by computing the BAS
Total (BAS-T) scores (as in Alloy et al., 2012). Participants with
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TABLE 2 | MANCOVA results for cognitive measures for Rapid-response impulsivity group: Presented are raw means (standard deviations) and F-statistic.
Variable Low
Rapid-response
impulsivity group
(n = 65)
High
Rapid-response
impulsivity group
(n = 73)
F(1,135) Partial Eta
Squared
GNGT – number of commission errors 5.17 (6.3) 5.71 (5.6) 0.27 0.00
GNGT – Mean RT 363.19 (55.4) 358.96 (64.8) 0.18 0.00
SST – number of commission errors 12.91 (9.1) 15.03 (9.9) 1.7 0.01
SSRT 275.19 (160.4) 258.89 (162.9) 0.41 0.00
DDT 0.53 (0.2) 0.59 (0.1) 7.56∗∗ 0.05
For the DDT, the proportion of small-immediate/large-delayed reward choices is shown. GNGT, Go/No-Go Task; RT, reaction time; SST, Stop-Signal Task; SSRT, Stop-
Signal reaction time; DDT, Delay Discounting Task. ∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE 3 | MANCOVA results for psychometric measures for Rapid-response impulsivity group: Presented are raw means (standard deviations) and F-statistic.
Variable Low
Rapid-response
impulsivity group
(n = 65)
High
Rapid-response
impulsivity group
(n = 73)
F(1,135) Partial Eta
Squared
BAS total 39.02 (4.1) 41.41 (4.8) 9.86∗∗ 0.07
BAS reward 17.51 (1.8) 17.75 (1.9) 0.66 0.01
BAS drive 10.68 (1.9) 11.21 (2.4) 2.01 0.02
BAS fun 10.83 (1.8) 12.45 (2.1) 23.56∗∗ 0.15
EPQ psychoticism 2.00 (1.5) 2.89 (1.7) 10.21∗∗ 0.07
UPPS urgency 26.17 (5.3) 31.93 (6.9) 32.14∗∗ 0.19
UPPS (lack of) premeditation 18.02 (3.6) 22.92 (5.3) 41.05∗∗ 0.23
UPPS (lack of) perseverance 18.57 (4.9) 22.12 (5.2) 17.41∗∗ 0.11
UPPS sensation seeking 32.09 (7.1) 33.82 (7.0) 2.12 0.02
BAS, Behavioral Activation System; EPQ, Eysenck Personality Questionnaire; UPPS, Urgency, Premeditation Perseverance, Sensation (Questionnaire). ∗∗p < 0.01.
scores in the highest 15th percentile on the BAS-T (high BAS-T
score cut point ≥ 45) were assigned to a high reward-delay
impulsivity group (n = 30). The low reward-delay impulsivity
group (n = 53) consisted of participants with moderate scores, i.e.,
40th and 60th percentiles, on the BAS (cut points≥ 38 and≤ 41).
Means and standard deviations of variables are presented in
Tables 4, 5.
A MANCOVA was performed to contrast the low
reward-delay impulsivity group and the high reward-delay
impulsivity group on all cognitive measures’ variables (see
Table 4), controlling for mental health history. The overall
MANCOVA showed that the groups divided by their level of
reward-delay impulsivity were significantly different (Wilks
λ = 0.87, F(5,76) = 2.36, p = 0.048, η2 = 0.13). Univariate
ANOVAs were conducted to test a priori hypotheses, using
Bonferroni correction as implemented in SPSS, which revealed
significant differences between groups for the proportion of
smaller vs. larger reward choices in the DDT, with a close to
medium effect size estimate (F(1,80) = 4.42, p = 0.039, η2 = 0.05).
A MANCOVA was performed to contrast the low
reward-delay impulsivity group and the high reward-delay
impulsivity group on all self-report measures’ variables (see
TABLE 4 | MANCOVA results for cognitive measures for Reward-delay impulsivity group: Presented are raw means (standard deviations) and F-statistic.
Variable Low
Reward-delay
impulsivity group
(n = 53)
High
Reward-delay
impulsivity group
(n = 30)
F(1,80) Partial Eta
Squared
GNGT – number of commission errors 3.47 (3.5) 5.07 (4.2) 3.57 0.04
GNGT – Mean RT 359.10 (53.8) 378.91 (70.5) 2.44 0.03
SST – number of commission errors 13.68 (9.5) 15.07 (10.6) 0.33 0.00
SSRT 260.90 (174.1) 279.30 (165.9) 0.34 0.00
DDT 0.53 (0.1) 0.60 (0.1) 4.42∗ 0.05
For the DDT, the proportion of small-immediate/large-delayed reward choices is shown. GNGT, Go/No-Go Task; RT, reaction time; SST, Stop-Signal Task; SSRT, Stop-
Signal reaction time; DDT, Delay Discounting Task. ∗p < 0.05.
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TABLE 5 | MANCOVA results for psychometric measures for Reward-delay impulsivity group: Presented are raw Means (standard deviations) and F-statistic.
Variable Low
Reward-delay
impulsivity group
(n = 53)
High
Reward-delay
impulsivity group
(n = 30)
F(1,80) Partial Eta
Squared
BIS-11 total 61.46 (11.6) 69.42 (12.5) 9.08∗∗ 0.10
BIS-11 non-planning 22.25 (4.8) 24.64 (5.4) 4.39∗ 0.05
BIS-11 attention 18.51 (4.7) 19.25 (4.1) 0.86 0.01
BIS-11 motor 21.33 (4.9) 25.83 (4.7) 16.97∗∗ 0.18
EPQ psychoticism 2.17 (1.5) 2.83 (1.7) 3.58 0.04
UPPS urgency 29.19 (6.7) 31.17 (6.8) 2.24 0.03
UPPS (lack of) premeditation 20.42 (4.4) 20.80 (6.0) 0.21 0.03
UPPS (lack of) perseverance 20.89 (5.1) 18.27 (4.6) 5.03∗ 0.06
UPPS sensation seeking 31.32 (6.9) 36.90 (7.7) 11.32∗∗ 0.12
BIS-11, Barratt Impulsiveness Questionnaire 11; EPQ, Eysenck Personality Questionnaire; UPPS, Urgency, Premeditation Perseverance, Sensation (Questionnaire).
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
Table 5), controlling for mental health history. The overall
MANCOVA showed that the groups divided by their level of
reward-delay impulsivity were significantly different (Wilks
λ = 0.55, F(9,72) = 6.44, p = 0.000, η2 = 0.45). Univariate
ANOVAs revealed significant differences between groups for
BIS-11 Total scores (F(1,80) = 9.08, p = 0.003, η2 = 0.10), BIS-11
Non-Planning scores (F(1,80) = 4.39, p = 0.039, η2 = 0.05),
BIS-11 Motor scores (F(1,80) = 16.97, p = 0.000, η2 = 0.18),
UPPS (Lack of) Perseverance scores (F(1,80) = 5.03, p = 0.028,
η2 = 0.06) and UPPS Sensation seeking scores (F(1,80) = 11.32,
p = 0.001, η2 = 0.12). Partial eta-squared estimates suggested
medium to large effect sizes for these measures, ranging from
0.05 to 0.18.
Rapid-Response Impulsivity and Reward-Delay
Impulsivity Combined Group
Here, groups divided by their level of rapid-response impulsivity
and reward-delay impulsivity were combined into either a single
high-impulsivity group or a single low-impulsivity group, using
the combined scores of the BIS-11 Motor and BAS-Total scales.
The high-impulsivity group (n = 23) consisted of participants
scoring high on both scales (scores within the highest 35th
percentile of the BIS-11 Motor subscale in the whole sample
and the highest 15th percentile of BAS-Total scale). The
low-impulsivity group (n = 22) included participants scoring
low on the BIS-11 Motor subscale (lowest 35th percentile) and
moderately on the BAS-Total scale (between the 40th and 60th
percentiles). Means and standard deviations of variables are
presented in Table 6.
A MANCOVA was performed to contrast the two groups on
all the cognitive measures of impulsivity (see Table 6), controlling
for mental health history. The overall MANCOVA showed
that the groups were significantly different (Wilks λ = 0.64,
F(5,38) = 4.28, p = 0.003, η2 = 0.36). Univariate ANOVAs
revealed significant differences between groups for GNGT raw
number of commission errors (F(1,42) = 7.50, p = 0.009,
η2 = 0.15), SST raw number of commission errors (F(1,42) = 5.95,
p = 0.019, η2 = 0.12) and the proportion of smaller vs. larger
reward choices in the DDT (F(1,42) = 8.76, p = 0.005, η2 = 0.17).
Partial eta-squared estimates suggested large effect sizes for these
measures, ranging from 0.13 to 0.17.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we compared different cognitive and self-report
measures of impulsivity within a sample of undergraduate
students. We examined how sensitive these measures are to
detect differences between groups classified as being low in
impulsivity and high in impulsivity, based on two factors:
level of rapid-response impulsivity (Swann et al., 2009) and
reward-delay impulsivity (Alloy et al., 2006). The results
comparing groups via general linear model analyses partly
supported our three hypotheses: (1) The group with elevated
rapid-response impulsivity had significantly higher scores on
self-reports measuring reward-delay impulsivity than the low
rapid-response impulsivity group. The group with elevated
reward-delay impulsivity had significantly higher scores on
self-reports measuring rapid-response impulsivity than the
low reward-delay impulsivity group. (2) The high-impulsivity
group, as defined by high scores on rapid-response impulsivity
and reward-delay impulsivity self-report measures, performed
significantly worse on the GNGT and SST and, on the DDT,
preferred small but immediate rewards over larger, delayed
rewards significantly more often than the low-impulsivity group.
(3) Correlations between the cognitive tasks and self-report
measures were also examined, since mostly contradictory results
have been reported to date (Rodrìguez-Fornells et al., 2002; Horn
et al., 2003; Cheung et al., 2004; Spinella, 2004; Keilp et al.,
2005; Lijffijt et al., 2005; Enticott et al., 2006; Reynolds et al.,
2006; Aichert et al., 2012; Malesza and Ostaszewski, 2016). We
aimed to clarify which aspects of trait impulsivity are related
to response inhibition and which to reward responsiveness and
hypothesized that the experimental tasks would significantly
correlate with questionnaires measuring different aspects of
impulsivity. This was met for the DDT, as there were significant
positive correlations with the BIS-11 Total scale and the BIS-11
Non-Planning subscale. However, the rapid-response impulsivity
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TABLE 6 | MANCOVA results for behavioral measures for Rapid-response impulsivity and Reward-delay impulsivity combined group: Presented are raw Means (standard
deviations) and F-statistic.
Variable Low impulsivity
group (n = 22)
High impulsivity
group (n = 23)
F(1,42) Partial Eta
Squared
GNGT – number of commission errors 2.50 (2.3) 5.17 (4.5) 7.50∗∗ 0.15
GNGT – Mean RT 357.01 (51.5) 388.19 (76.6) 2.74 0.6
SST – number of commission errors 9.73 (7.1) 15.91 (10.3) 5.95∗ 0.12
SSRT 307.99 (173.7) 279.86 (147.4) 0.38 0.01
DDT 0.49 (0.2) 0.62 (0.1) 8.76∗∗ 0.17
For the DDT, the proportion of small-immediate/large-delayed reward choices is shown. GNGT, Go/No-Go Task; RT, reaction time; SST, Stop-Signal Task; SSRT, Stop-
Signal reaction time; DDT, Delay Discounting Task. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
tasks (GNGT, SST) did not directly correlate with any of the
self-report measures. These results will be discussed in more
detail in the following sections organized by impulsivity factors.
Rapid-Response Impulsivity
The BIS-11 is one of the most widely used measures of trait
impulsivity, and the Motor subscale assesses the tendency to
act on the spur of the moment. This sub-scale examines the
lack of inhibitory control observed in rapid-response impulsivity,
the impulsivity dimension of interest here. In the current study,
high rapid-response impulsivity group, as identified by their level
of rapid-response impulsivity measured by the BIS-11 Motor
subscale, showed significantly higher scores in all reward-delay
impulsivity measures:
(1) Behaviorally, on the DDT, participants in high
rapid-response impulsivity group preferred small
but immediate rewards over larger, delayed rewards
significantly more often than low rapid-response
impulsivity group.
(2) On the BAS Total score, which measures BAS sensitivity
toward rewards.
(3) On the BAS Fun Seeking subscale, which measures
willingness to approach new and potentially rewarding
experiences, and which is the only BAS subscale that
overlaps with impulsivity (Alloy et al., 2009).
(4) On the UPPS (Lack of) Premeditation subscale, which
measures the inability to reflect on the consequences of
one’s actions before engaging in them, and which has been
related to reward-delay impulsivity (Lynam and Miller,
2004).
Participants in the high rapid-response impulsivity group
also had significantly higher scores on other motor impulsivity
measures, such as the UPPS Urgency subscale, on measures
theoretically related to rapid-response impulsivity, like the
UPPS (Lack of) Perseverance subscale, and on trait impulsivity
measures like the EPQ Psychoticism subscale. Contrary to our
expectations, no significant differences were observed between
participants in the high- and low-rapid-response impulsivity
group on the GNGT and the SST tasks, which was surprising.
Although high scores on the BIS-11 have been reported to be
correlated with worse performance in the GNGT (e.g., Keilp et al.,
2005; Enticott et al., 2006; Reynolds et al., 2006), other studies
have reported that healthy individuals scoring high on self-report
measures of impulsivity do not show impaired performance in
response inhibition paradigms (Fallgatter and Herrmann, 2001;
Horn et al., 2003; Dimoska and Johnstone, 2007; Lansbergen
et al., 2007; Aichert et al., 2012; Wilbertz et al., 2014). This
could be the case here too, as behavioral approaches have been
suggested to measure task performance during a limited and at
an exact moment in time, while self-report measures might focus
on self-reported trait impulsivity, manifested across time and
different situations (Lane et al., 2003; Reynolds et al., 2006; Cyders
and Coskunpinar, 2011).
We also examined the associations between response
inhibition paradigms and rapid-response impulsivity
questionnaires. Contrary to our predictions, neither the
GNGT nor the SST were significantly associated with self-report
measures assessing rapid response impulsivity. Although
previous studies have reported significant correlations between
the GNGT and the BIS-11 (e.g., Spinella, 2004; Keilp et al., 2005;
Enticott et al., 2006; Reynolds et al., 2006), others did not report
such associations (e.g., Horn et al., 2003; Kulendran et al., 2016).
Similarly, the SSRT, the main measure of the SST, has been
shown to significantly correlate with the UPPS Sensation Seeking
subscale (Aichert et al., 2012) and with the EPQ (e.g., Logan
et al., 1997; Marsh et al., 2002). However, other studies have
not reported such relationship (e.g., Rodrìguez-Fornells et al.,
2002; Cheung et al., 2004; Keilp et al., 2005; Lijffijt et al., 2005;
Enticott et al., 2006; Reynolds et al., 2006). It is possible that the
fusion, or amalgamation of the different concepts of impulsivity
has resulted in such inconsistencies (Cyders and Coskunpinar,
2011).
Taken together, our findings provide some evidence for
a relationship between rapid-response and reward-delay
impulsivity. Participants in the high rapid-response impulsivity
group as measured by scores on the BIS-11 Motor subscale,
showed significantly higher reward-delay impulsivity, both
on the cognitive task, i.e., the DDT and self-report measures
assessing reward sensitivity, i.e., the BIS/BAS. These findings
are associated with medium to large effect sizes, despite modest
sample sizes thus suggesting some robustness to the observations.
We observed no associations between self-report measures and
cognitive tasks measuring rapid-response impulsivity. Our
results, therefore, suggest that the BIS-11 Motor subscale
might not be assessing rapid-response impulsivity in the same
way as the cognitive tasks assessing response inhibition. This
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may highlight the fact that self-report measures expected to
specifically assess motor impulsivity (e.g., BIS-11 motor subscale,
UPPS Urgency) might not directly be linked to the cognitive
effects of rapid-response impulsivity. This finding is in line with
other studies stating a lack of associations between cognitive tasks
assessing impulsivity and trait measures of impulsiveness (e.g.,
Kulendran et al., 2016). As mentioned previously, task-based
measures of impulsivity assess concepts like response inhibition
at an exact moment in time and for a very short duration,
while self-report measures focus more on trait impulsivity,
expressed over time and different situations (Lane et al., 2003;
Reynolds et al., 2006; Cyders and Coskunpinar, 2011). A lack of,
or minimal correlations, between cognitive task of impulsivity
and self-report measures have previously been argued to point
toward the fact that these assessments may measure different
aspects of impulsivity (e.g., Lane et al., 2003; Reynolds et al.,
2006) or that this information is collected in different ways, and
may be an assessment-related confound. Here, however, both
self-report measures and cognitive tasks were conducted on a
computer.
Furthermore, although Wilbertz et al. (2014) used BIS-11
Total scores to sub-divide their sample, they subsequently
showed that the UPPS Urgency subscale, which measures “the
tendency to engage in impulsive behaviors under conditions of
negative affect” (Whiteside et al., 2005, p. 561) better explains
individual variability in relation to RI performance. Although
the UPPS Urgency subscale is conceptually similar to the BIS-11
Motor subscale, except for its focus on negative affect, it seems it
may also be more sensitive to behavioral effects of rapid-response
impulsivity.
Reward-Delay Impulsivity
The BIS/BAS scales, specifically the BAS subscales, were used
to classify participants by their level of reward-delay impulsivity
(in line with Alloy et al., 2009). We compared participants
scoring high on the BAS subscales (high reward-delay impulsivity
group) to those with moderate scores (low reward-delay
impulsivity group) on the same subscales. Because low BAS
has previously been linked with unipolar depression (Fowles,
1988; Depue and Iacono, 1989; Kasch et al., 2002), the
moderate BAS group was chosen for comparisons with the
high BAS group. The reason for not using the specific BAS
Reward Responsiveness subscale was based on a previous study
which related this subscale to the responsiveness to already
obtained rewards (Alloy et al., 2009), not to the expectation
of receiving a reward. The high reward-delay impulsivity
group showed significantly higher scores on the BIS-11 Motor
subscale. Although no significant differences were found on
the GNGT and SST, results on the BIS-11 Motor subscale
suggest that this group also exhibits rapid-response impulsivity
characteristics.
The high reward-delay impulsivity group also had significantly
higher scores on measures related to trait impulsivity, such as
the UPPS Sensation Seeking subscale. Consistent with previous
findings (e.g., Alloy et al., 2006, 2009), our results indicate
that participants with high reward-delay impulsivity show
higher trait impulsivity AND higher rapid-response impulsivity,
as measured by self-report measures. Likewise, those with
high rapid-response impulsivity scored significantly higher on
reward-delay impulsivity measures. These results, along with the
significant correlations observed between the BIS-11 and all three
BAS subscales, and between the DDT and the BIS-11 Total and
BIS-11 Non-Planning subscale, suggest that rapid-response and
reward-delay impulsivity are closely related to each other.
Importantly, the high reward-delay impulsivity group not
only showed significantly higher trait impulsivity compared to
the low reward-delay impulsivity group, but also performed
significantly different on the reward-delay impulsivity task, the
DDT. This, together with the medium to large effect size
reported for this sample further validates the construct of
reward-delay impulsivity as being a crucial characteristic of
trait impulsivity. Previous studies using the BIS/BAS scales
comparing task performance of patients and healthy individuals
have reported significant differences for risk-taking (Black et al.,
2014) or reward tasks, such as the card-sorting task (Hayden and
Heilbronner, 2014), while others reported non-significant results
when using paradigms assessing reward responsiveness (Alloy
et al., 2012).
Rapid-Response and Reward-Delay
Impulsivity Combined
When combining both, the rapid-response impulsivity groups
with the reward-delay impulsivity groups (see methods for
detail), the group scoring high on both impulsivity dimensions
and the group scoring low on both impulsivity dimensions,
showed characteristics that were rather different to those
of ‘single’ low vs. high-impulsive groups. The combined
high rapid-response impulsivity and reward-delay impulsivity
group performed significantly worse than the combined low
rapid-response impulsivity and reward-delay impulsivity group
on the two tasks measuring rapid-response impulsivity; they
also preferred small but immediate rewards over larger,
delayed rewards significantly more often. The latter indicates
a more pronounced reward-delay impulsivity than that for the
low rapid-response impulsivity and reward-delay impulsivity
group.
While differences between high- and low-impulsivity groups
are less clear when individuals are categorized based on
either impulsivity dimension, differences between high- and
low-impulsivity groups are more specific, and pronounced, when
combining both dimensions. Although previous papers have not
reported impaired performance in healthy individuals scoring
high in trait impulsivity (e.g., Aichert et al., 2012; Wilbertz
et al., 2014), our results suggest that self-report measures of
rapid response impulsivity alone may not be sensitive enough
to pick up the differences between groups in response inhibition
paradigms (as seen in the current study, when using the BIS-11
Motor scores alone). However, when including a related, and
perhaps necessary, dimension, namely that of reward-delay
impulsivity, differences between groups were observed. However,
the opposite could therefore also be true, i.e., our results also show
that self-report measures of reward-delay impulsivity alone may
not be sensitive enough to pick up the differences in response
inhibition paradigms. However, when including a related, and
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perhaps necessary, dimension, namely that of rapid-response
impulsivity, differences between groups were observed. These
findings should be taken with caution, however, as the number
of individuals in this combined impulsivity group is quite low, as
only about 13.8% of participants scored high on both dimensions
of impulsivity.
Additional analyses were therefore conducted to assess
whether the differences in results between combined impulsivity
groups and single impulsivity groups were affected by the
difference in participant numbers. This would indicate whether
the observed effects were due to comparing the very extreme ends
of impulsivity or were truly related to the combination of the
two impulsivity dimensions. To test this, separate MANCOVAs
were performed for rapid-response and reward-delay impulsivity
including only the top 22 low- and the top 23 high-scorers,
i.e., the same number of individuals in each group as for the
combined impulsivity group analysis. MANCOVAs showed that
groups were not significantly different when classified by level
of reward-delay impulsivity (Wilks λ = 0.86, F(5,38) = 1.28,
p > 0.05) or by level of rapid-response impulsivity (Wilks
λ = 0.90, F(5,38) = 0.87, p > 0.05). These analyses showed
no significant differences between groups in any of the three
cognitive tasks. Therefore, it is the combination of the two
dimensions of impulsivity that provides a more sensitive
assessment.
Limitations
While the high reward-delay impulsivity group made
significantly more commission errors on the GNGT, we
expected the SST would show similar results, as both tasks
are thought to measure rapid-response impulsivity. The lack
of significant results on the SST in this specific comparison
might be explained by the absence of a staircase procedure,
which would have adapted the time between the “go” and “stop”
stimuli based on whether the previous trial was successfully
inhibited or not, increasing the difficulty of the task. Current
findings should be taken with caution, as the number of
individuals in the group which combined the high rapid-
response impulsivity individuals and the high reward-sensitivity
individuals is quite low. Only about 13.8% of participants
scored high on both dimensions of impulsivity, which limits
the generalizability of our data. However, Wilbertz et al.
(2014) who used the BIS-11 to identify high or low impulsive
individuals reported selecting 52 from 452 participants which
is a similar percentage. Our participants were recruited entirely
from a student population and findings may thus not be
generalizable to other populations. Although GNG tasks have
widely been used within neuropsychological assessments
(Luria, 1973; Drewe, 1975), limited information regarding their
standardization and validation appears available (Langenecker
et al., 2007). The GNGT’s internal validity is thought to be
limited because there are many variants of the task (Bodnar
et al., 2007). Furthermore, GNG tasks vary greatly in terms
of proportion of go and no-go stimuli, the types and timing
of the stimuli used and in how similar target and non-target
stimuli can be (Langenecker et al., 2007). Our study uses
letters, in both the GNGT and SST, stimuli which may be less
ecologically valid than using pictorial images, for example faces,
in response inhibition tasks. Schulz et al. (2007), however,
showed that commission errors on a traditional GNGT task
(using circles) and those on an emotional GNGT (using
facial expressions) showed moderate correlations between
both measures. Further limitations that should be considered
are limited screening for psychopathology, no screening for
neurological conditions or use of prescription medication taken
at the time of testing. Any of these factors could affect the
presented results.
Implications and Future Directions
Here, we have shown that the combination of different
dimensions of impulsivity is better able to differentiate
individuals who present high and low levels of trait impulsivity.
Given that impulsivity has been reported to characterize several
mental disorders it is feasible to investigate impulsivity in
the context of mental disorder, and to consider its potential
to predict risk for psychopathology. It seems plausible that
reward-delay impulsivity and response inhibition represent
shared vulnerabilities for mental health conditions characterized
by deficits in impulse control, e.g., bipolar disorder, substance
use disorders and addictions (e.g., Bari and Robbins, 2013).
Furthermore, both, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM) and International Classification
of Diseases (ICD), recognize impulsivity as a diagnostic
criterion for these disorders, and specifically those aspects
which can be considered unplanned, on-the-spur-of-the-
moment reaction with no regard for consequences, sense of
urgency and self-harming behaviors, especially during times
of emotional instability (Moeller et al., 2001). Therefore,
it is important to investigate these two dimensions in
conjunction.
Furthermore, given the behavioral and psychometrical base
of measures of rapid response and reward-delay impulsivity,
they might be used in future to aid in designing a screening
tool to assess risk for psychopathology based on these two
impulsivity dimensions. Such a screening tool could also
benefit from the clarification of personality characteristics
provided here, on each dimension of impulsivity. The
acknowledgment of the specific aspects of impulsivity could
also be useful when providing individuals high in impulsivity
with strategies to recognize impulsive behaviors or thoughts,
or with tools to reduce their impulsivity in certain situations,
as in mindfulness-based strategies to reduce impulsivity
(e.g., Stratton, 2006; Lattimore et al., 2011). Furthermore,
neuroimaging studies using these response inhibition and
delay discounting paradigms could compare high and low
impulsive groups and provide detailed information of the neural
correlates of these impulsivity dimensions in young healthy
individuals.
CONCLUSION
In summary, this study compared different measures of
impulsivity, to examine how sensitive these measures are to
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differences between low and high impulsive groups, based
on two impulsivity dimensions: rapid-response impulsivity
and reward-delay impulsivity. Results show that the proposed
measures were sensitive to differences between groups.
Participants with higher impulsivity, as measured by high
rapid-response impulsivity scores on the BIS-11 Motor subscale,
show significantly increased trait impulsivity as well as behavioral
and self-reported reward-delay impulsivity. Conversely, the high
reward-delay impulsivity group had significantly higher trait
impulsivity and behavioral and self-reported rapid-response
impulsivity. When both dimensions of impulsivity were
combined, the high-impulsivity group performed significantly
worse on both response inhibition paradigms (GNG and SST)
and temporally discounted in a significantly more impulsive
manner in the reward-delay task than the low-risk group.
These findings provide evidence that combining impulsivity
dimensions provides a better predictor of impulsivity level than
each dimension alone.
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